Abstract.
Introduction
A bargaining solution expresses 'reasonable'compromises on the division of a surplus within a group. In this paper we ask the following question: given a bargaining solution, does there exist a complete and strict relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible set A, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to A? If the answer is positive, we call the bargaining solution an uncovered bargaining solution.
We o¤er two (related) motivations. First, a bargaining solution can be interpreted as a fair arbitration scheme (as argued for instance in Mariotti [9] ). In this sense, we may think of a bargaining solution as being rati…ed (or rati…able) by a committee.
In this interpretation, the tournament expresses the majority preferences of the committee, and the uncovered set is the solution to the majority aggregation problem.
A bargaining solution that does not coincide with the solution of any tournament is certainly not fair in the described sense: it could not be rati…ed by any committee.
A second interpretation follows the 'group revealed preference'interpretation pioneered by Peters and Wakker [11] . As they argue, 'the agreements reached in bargaining games may be thought to reveal the preferences of the bargainers as a group' (p. 1787). A tournament is a non-standard type of preference (lacking transitivity), which has recently been considered in individual choice theory (Ehlers and Sprumont [4] , Lombardi [7] ). It seems even more appropriate to consider such non-standard preference for a group than for an individual.
For single valued solutions the issue under study has essentially been solved, since a single valued uncovered bargaining solution maximizes (if certain regularity conditions are met) 1 a binary relation (in other words, the solution point is a Condorcet winner of the underlying tournament). For the domain of convex problems, Peters and Wakker [11] have shown that this is the case if and only if the solution satis…es Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 2 . Denicolò and Mariotti [3] show that 1 See the end of the next section for a discussion of this point. 2 Peters and Wakker work with a weak relation. However it is easy to show -by using elementary duality properties in the maximization of binary relations -that a strict relation could be used instead. See e.g. Kim and Richter [6] or Aleskerov and Monjardet [1] for discussions of this issue in the same holds for certain domains of non-convex problems, provided that Strong Pareto Optimality is assumed. In this latter case the binary relation is transitive.
Therefore, the problem under study is new and interesting only for multivalued solutions. It is thus natural to look at a domain of nonconvex problems, as many notable solutions (such as the Nash Bargaining Solution) are single-valued on a domain of convex problems.
We focus on solutions which satisfy a 'resoluteness'condition: loosely speaking, when only two feasible alternatives x and y are Pareto optimal (so the bargaining problem is essentially binary), the solution picks either x or y. 
Preliminaries
An n-person bargaining problem is a pair (A; d), with d 2 A and A < n , where A represents the set of feasible alternatives and d is the disagreement point.
The null-vector is denoted 0 2 < n . The vector inequalities in < n are: x > y (resp.: x > y) if and only if x i > y i (resp.: x i > y i ) for every i. We view, as usual, x 2 < n as a utility or welfare vector for n agents.
A domain of bargaining problem B is said to be admissible if:
A is compact, and there exists x 2 A such that x > d.
D2
For all x; y 2 < Many bargaining domains considered in the literature are particular cases of admissible domains 3 . For example the set of comprehensive problems (Zhou [12] , Peters and Vermeulen [10] ), the set of …nite problems (Mariotti [8] , Peters and Vermeulen [10] ), the set of all problems satisfying D1 (Kaneko [5] ), the set of d-star shaped problems 4 . D2 guarantees the existence of a 'minimal'problem containing any two given alternatives x and y, and such that x and y are the only strongly Pareto optimal feasible alternatives.
Unless speci…ed otherwise, B is from now on a class of n-person admissible bargaining problems. A bargaining solution on B is a nonempty correspondence f :
Given a bargaining solution f , we say that an alternative x 2 A is the f-Condorcet
with y 6 = x. Moreover, x 2 A is said to be an f-Condorcet loser in (A; d), denoted by
Finally, the following abuses of notation will be repeated throughout this note:
We consider only resolute solutions, that is those which satisfy the following property. For all x; y 2 < n , with x 6 = y, for all A < n :
Resoluteness is analogous to a property with the same name imposed by Ehlers and Sprumont [4] and Lombardi [7] for individual choice functions over …nite choice sets, given that (in the presence of Strong Pareto Optimality, de…ned below) the minimal problem M (x; y) involves essentially a choice between only two alternatives.
For standard solutions that are obtained by maximizing a quasiconcave 'social welfare function'(e.g. the Nash Bargaining Solution or the Utilitarian solution) this involves adding a tie-breaking criterion on minimal problems.
In addition the following properties will be used in the characterization result.
Strong Pareto Optimality is standard. Axioms 2 is a generalization of the natural 'Condorcet Winner Principle'
which is implied by setting B = ; in axiom 2.
Axiom 3 is a weak independence property. It says that if an alternative x is the unique solution point in a minimal problem where the only other Pareto optimal feasible alternative is y, and if y is the unique solution point in a minimal problem where the only other Pareto optimal feasible alternative is z, then x is a solution point of a minimal problem where the only other Pareto optimal feasible alternatives are y and z. Consider the following standard contraction consistency axiom 5 : We are, as usual, only interested in solutions that satisfy translation invariance.
Then, we can set d 0. A bargaining problem simply becomes a subset of < n containing the null-vector and the notation is simpli…ed accordingly.
A binary relation T < n < n is a tournament if it is asymmetric (i.e., for every
x; y 2 < n , x 6 = y, (x; y) 2 T ) (y; x) = 2 T ) and weakly connected (i.e., for every
x; y 2 < n with x 6 = y, f(x; y) ; (y; x)g \ T 6 = ;). We denote by T the set of all tournaments on < n . A restriction of T to A < n , denoted by T jA, is a tournament. For x 2 < n , let T 1 (x) and T (x) denote the lower and upper sections of T at x, respectively, that is:
T (x) = fy 2 < n j (y; x) 2 T g .
For any tournament T 2 T and A < n , de…ne its covering relation CjA on A by:
The uncovered set of T jA, denoted U C (T jA), consists of the CjA maximal elements of A, that is:
The Strong Pareto relation P on < n is de…ned by for x; y 2 < n , x 6 = y: (x; y) 2 P , x i y i for all i, and x j > y j for some j.
We say that a tournament T 2 T is Pareto consistent if for x; y; z 2 < n , with
x 6 = y 6 = z:
So, a Pareto consistent tournament includes the Strong Pareto relation and satis…es a form of 'Pareto transitivity': any x which Pareto dominates y will beat any alternative z which is beaten by y.
De…nition 5. A bargaining solution f is an uncovered set bargaining solution (UCBS)
if there exists T 2 T such that, for every A 2 B, f (A) = U C (T jA). In this case we say that T rationalizes f .
As an example of an UCBS which does not coincide with a standard solution, consider the following class. Let F be a asymmetric transitive and weakly connected relation, which here we interpret as 'fairness' 6 . Recall that P is the Strong Pareto relation. Then de…ne the solution f by: x 2 f (A) i¤ for all y 2 Anx: either (x; y) 2 P ; or problem, the uncovered set of the tournament T de…ned by: (x; y) 2 T i¤ either (x; y) 2 P ; or [(y; x) = 2 P and (x; y) 2 F ] (note that T is weakly connected and asymmetric); or both.
Finally, we come back brie ‡y to the issue of single-valued solutions alluded to in the introduction. Let T be a tournament on A, and suppose U C (T jA)) = fxg for some x 2 A. If x is not a Condorcet winner, T (x) is nonempty. Let
. Then y 2 U C (T jA), since for any z 2 T 1 (x) we have (y; x) ; (x; z) 2 T . But this contradicts the assumption that U C (T jA) = fxg. So 
Characterization
We show below that in the presence of Resoluteness, axioms 1-4 characterize uncovered bargaining solutions for which the rationalizing tournament is Pareto consistent. Moreover, as y = 2 f (M (y; w)) for all w 2 Bny, there exists w 0 2 M (w; y) ny which covers y. If w 0 = w, then (w; y) 2 T . Otherwise, consider w 0 6 = w. Since w 0 is not strongly Pareto dominated by y, it must be the case that (w; w 0 ) 2 P , by D2.
It follows from Pareto consistency of T that (w; y) 2 T . Therefore, whether or not w = w 0 we have that (w; y) 2 T . Since (x; z) 2 T for all z 2 Anx [ y and (w; y) 2 T for all w 2 Bny, it follows that x covers y, and so y = 2 U C (T jA [ B) as desired.
For axiom 3, let x; y; z 2 < n , with x 6 = y 6 = z, and let x = f (M (x; y)) and
and y = f (M (y; z)), there exists a Pareto consistent T such that (x; x 0 ) 2 T for all x 0 2 M (x; y) nx and (y;
(If). Let f be a resolute bargaining solution satisfying the axioms. De…ne the relation T on < n as follows:
for all x; y 2 < n , with x 6 = y, (x; z) 2 T i¤ x = f (M (x; y)) .
For all x; y 2 < n , with x 6 = y, there exists a minimal problem M (x; y), by D2. It follows from Strong Pareto Optimality and Resoluteness that either x = f (M (x; y)) or y = f (M (x; y)). Then, T is weakly connected and asymmetric, and so T 2 T
. To see that T is Pareto consistent as well, let x; y; z 2 < n , with x 6 = y 6 = z. We show that i) xP y ) xT y, and ii) (x; y) 2 P & (y; z) 2 T ) (x; z) 2 T . Case i) directly follows from Strong Pareto Optimality. Next, we show case ii). Since x = f (M (x; y)) and y = f (M (y; z)), it follows from axiom 3 combined with D3
implies that x = f (M (x; z)), and we are done.
We claim that
Fix A 2 B. For any x 2 A partition A in T (x), T 1 (x) and fxg.
Let x 2 f (A) and assume, to the contrary, that x is a covered point. Then for some y 2 Anx it must be the case that (y; x) 2 T and T 1 (x) T 1 (y). Therefore
, and consider the minimal bargaining
and so x 2 CL (T (x) [ x). It follows from axiom 2 that x = 2 f (A), a contradiction.
Conversely, let x 2 U C (T jA). Take any y 2 T 1 (x), and consider the minimal bargaining problem M (x; y). By de…nition of T it follows that x = f (M (x; y)).
Because it is true for any y 2 T 1 (x), we have that
T (x) = ?, it follows from the Condorcet Winner Principle implied by axiom 2 that x 2 f (A). Otherwise, take any z 2 T (x). Since T is Pareto consistent and z 2 T (x), there exists y 2 T 1 (x) which is not strongly Pareto dominated either by x nor by z such that (y; z) 2 T . Axiom 3, combined with D3, implies that
Because this holds for any z 2 T (x), axiom 4 implies that x 2 f (A).
Independence of the axioms
The axioms used in theorem 6 are tight, as argued next. Next, let us consider for simplicity only 2-person bargaining problems.
For an example violating only axiom 2, de…ne, for every x; y 2 < 2 + , with x 6 = y:
whilst, for any non-minimal problem A 2 B, de…ne the bargaining solution f as:
To see that axiom 2 is contradicted, consider the domain of …nite problems, and let x; y; z 2 A, where x = (2; 1), y = (1; 2), and z = (1; 0). By de…nition, f (xy) = f (xz) = x, and f (yz) = y, but f (xyz) = xy, which violates axiom 2. Obviously, the bargaining solution is resolute, and it satis…es axioms 1 and 3-4.
For an example violating only axiom 3, …x y; z 2 < 2 ++ , with y 6 = z, such that
Given any other bargaining problem A 2 B, de…ne the bargaining solution f as the following:
To see that axiom 3 is contradicted, consider the domain of …nite problems, and let x; y; z 2 A, where x = (2; 2), y = (3; 1), and z = (1; 3). We have that f (xy) = y, f (xz) = x, and f (yz) = z. Consider the bargaining problem A 0 = fx; y; zg. Given that y; z 2 A 0 , it follows from de…nition of f that x = f (A 0 ), which violates axiom 3. Clearly, the bargaining solution is resolute and satis…es axiom 1. It is easy but tedious to check that it satis…es axioms 2 and 4 as well (details available from the authors).
Finally, for an example violating only axiom 4, …x x; y; z 2 < 2 ++ , with x 6 = y 6 = z and x 1 +x 2 = y 1 +y 2 = z 1 +z 2 , and let M (x; y)[M (y; z) = C 2 B with f (M (x; y)) = x, f (M (y; z)) = y, and f (M (x; z)) = z. De…ne for any a; b 2 < 2 + nfx; y; zg, with
for any a 2 < 2 + nfx; y; zg and b 2 fx; y; zg:
De…ne the following set of alternatives S a :
S a = fb 2 < 
To see that axiom 4 is contradicted, consider the domain of …nite problems, and let A = fx; y; z; wg, where x = (2; 2), y = (3; 1), z = (1; 3), and w = (1; 1). By construction f (xy) = x, f (yz) = y, f (xz) = z, and f (xyz) = xyz; furthermore, we have that f (xw) = x, f (yw) = y, and f (zw) = z. Let us consider the bargaining problem fx; z; wg = B. Since x; z 2 B and f (xz) = z, it follows from the de…nition of f that z = f (B). However, we have that z = 2 f (A), by de…nition of f , which violates axiom 4. The bargaining solution as de…ned above is obviously resolute and it satis…es 1. Moroeover, it can be checked that it satis…es axioms 2-3 (the tedious analysis is available from the authors).
Concluding remarks
Lombardi [7] studies choice correspondences on the domain of all subsets of an abstract …nite set, and poses the same question as this paper. At the technical level, the main di¢ culty here is that bargaining sets are not always …nite. This necessitates the di¤erent axioms and argument of proof presented in this paper, as well as the restriction to Pareto consistent tournaments. These arguments exploit heavily the ordering structure of < n and the natural Strong Pareto Optimality assumption, which is instead meaningless on the domain considered by Lombardi.
Ehlers and Sprumont [4] , on the same domain as Lombardi, characterize choice correspondences for which there exists a tournament such that, for each choice set, the choice is the top cycle of the tournament. It is natural to seek a similar characterization in the context of bargaining solutions, as we have done for the uncovered set. This remains an open question for future research.
